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[1] 
Technology Transfer and the TRIPS Agreement 
Are Developed Countries Meeting  
Their End of the Bargain? 
 




International trade agreements often integrate provisions requiring the transfer 
of technology from developed to least-developed countries under the assumption 
that technological development in the world’s poorest countries will help solve 
pressing global concerns.  At first, supplying tangible hardware and equipment to 
least-developed countries satisfied these trade obligations.  Today, however, 
modern development theory calls for a broader understanding of “technology” to 
include knowledge, skills, and human resource development.  Article 66.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement instructs developed country Members to incentivize domestic 
enterprises and institutions “for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members.” Least-developed 
countries protest that developed-country Members do not fulfill their obligations 
under Article 66.2, and that WTO enforcement of this provision does not satisfy 
current economic development standards.  This paper looks critically at Article 
66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and discusses whether developed countries are 
ensuring the successful flow of technology to resource-poor countries.  Concluding 
that developed countries do not meet the Article 66.2 mandate, this paper outlines 
how the WTO may ensure the international community works to address the 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A country’s economic modernization and long-term growth depends on 
its ability to develop and innovate technologically.1  Unfortunately, the 
world’s poorest countries often lack the infrastructure to absorb, 
implement, and create new technologies.2  With economies dominated by 
agriculture and “petty service” activities,3 resource-poor countries have an 
absence of firms with the knowledge and financial capacities required to 
integrate modern-day technologies, and to innovate on these technologies 
thereafter.4  Consequently, the technological and economic gap between the 
world’s least-developed and most-developed countries has increased 
dramatically since the mid-twentieth century.5  In light of this growing 
division, the international community recognizes the need to affirmatively 
facilitate the transfer of technology to developing and least-developed 
countries6 to accelerate their economic development and modernization.7  
Starting in 1950, countries began integrating technology transfer within 
international instruments to address climate change, health emergencies, 
 
 1.  See Ruth L. Okediji, Reframing International Copyright Limitations and Exceptions as 
Development Policy, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 429, 430 
(2017); Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods 
and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 287 (2004). 
 2.  See CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN LDCS: STRATEGIES FOR 
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DISSEMINATION 3 (2007), http://unctad.org/ 
Sections/ldc_dir/docs/ldcr2007_Correa_en.pdf. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Michelle H. Balaklaw, Helping Haiti: Incorporation NGO Technology Transfer into the 
TRIPS Agreement Framework to Aid Least Developed Countries in the Adoption of Clean 
Technologies, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 137, 143 (2016); see also 
CORREA, supra note 2 (noting that between 1991 and 2004, only 20 U.S. patents were granted to 
applicants from least-developed countries, compared with 1.8 million granted to applicants from 
developed countries).  Only 16% of the least-developed country population is estimated to have 
access to electricity compared to 99% in developed countries.  UN-OHRLLS, THE LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, THINGS TO KNOW, THINGS TO DO 5 (2009), http://www.unohrlls. 
org/UserFiles/File/LATEST%20IPoA.pdf. 
 6.  See Arno Hold & Bryan Christopher Mercurio, After the Second Extension of the 
Transition Period for LDCs 3 n.3 (NCCR Trade Reg., Working Paper No 2013/42, 2013) 
(“According to Article XI:2 of the WTO Agreement, the WTO recognizes those countries as 
least-developed which have been designated as such by the United Nations.”).  For the specific 
criteria used by the United Nations to classify “least-developed” countries, see infra Section I.B.  
There is no working definition for “developing” or “developed” countries.  See Suerie Moon, 
Meaningful Technology Transfer to LDCs: A Proposal for a Monitoring Mechanism for TRIPS 
Article 66.2, at 3 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Policy Brief Number 9, 2011), 
https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2011/05/technology-transfer-to-the-ldcs.pdf. 
 7.  See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and 
Capability for Education, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 803, 820 (2007). 
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and other pressing global concerns.8  Today, over 80 international 
instruments, and even more bilateral treaties, mandate technology transfer.9  
Technology transfer involves the diffusion and adoption of technology 
between parties.10  It can be direct or indirect, and always involves the 
transfer of technology from one institution (which developed the 
technology) to another (which adopts, adapts, and uses it).11  International 
technology transfer primarily flows through private markets,12 but may also 
take place through governments, nongovernmental organizations, and 
research bodies such as universities.13  While technology transfer typically 
occurs “formally” via foreign direct investment (FDI) or licensing 
agreements, it may also take place “informally” through processes such 
copying or reverse engineering.14   
The international community initially focused technology transfer 
programs exclusively on the acquisition of hardware and machinery, 
dispatching tangible items to least-developed countries.15  Consequently, 
technology transfer from developed to least-developed countries rarely 
included human resource development or domestic capacity building.16  
More recently, however, international development scholarship helped 
broaden the international community’s understanding of technology 
transfer to include the diffusion of knowledge and intangible know-how to 
least-developed countries.17  Now, developed countries may transfer 
 
 8.  See James Shepherd, The Future of Technology Transfer Under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, 37 ELR 10547, 10548 (2007), http://elr.info/sites/default/ 
files/articles/37.10547.pdf; Keith E. Maskus & Ruth L. Okediji, Intellectual Property Rights and 
International Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change 1 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and 
Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 32, 2010), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? 
doi=10.1.1.471.6938&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 9.  Shepherd, supra note 8, at n.2. 
 10.  Keith E. Maskus, Encouraging International Technology Transfer 9 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade 
and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 7, 2004), https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/07/b.pdf; 
Shepherd, supra note 8, at 10548–49; but see Suerie Moon, Does TRIPS Art. 66.2 Encourage 
Technology Transfer to LDCs? 3 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Policy Brief Number 
2, 2008), https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/12/policy_brief_2.pdf (“There is no standard 
definition of comprises technology transfer.”). 
 11.  Maskus, supra note 10. 
 12.  See Maskus & Okediji, supra note 8, at 6. 
 13.  Shepherd, supra note 8. 
 14.  CORREA, supra note 2, at 4 n.5. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See, e.g., Report of the Working Grp. on Trade and Transfer of Tech. to the Gen. 
Council, WTO Doc. WT/WGTTT/19 (Nov. 8, 2017) (“[T]he key component of any technology-
transfer process was the effective transfer of the skills and intangible know-how, successful 
learning and the effective application of such knowledge in enhancing production 
capability. . . .”). 
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technology by sending textbooks to schools in least-developed countries,18 
funding academic scholarships for students from least-developed 
countries,19 and training personnel at firms within least-developed 
countries.20 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS)21 is an international agreement 
that incorporates technology transfer.22  Specifically, Article 66.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement places a positive obligation on developed country 
Members “to provide incentives to enterprises and institutions for the 
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members.”23  Least-developed countries view this 
provision as the primary justification for their participation in the global 
intellectual property system, and specifically, within the WTO.24  These 
countries understand how technology transfer is integrally linked to their 
development priorities, 25 and thus see the Article 66.2 mandate as a 
necessary “part of the bargain” in which they agreed to join the WTO.26  
This paper looks closely at the text and implementation of Article 66.2, and 
evaluates whether developed countries meet their obligations under this 
provision.  Part I provides an overview of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
bargains reached between developed and least-developed countries to form 
the WTO.27  Part II focuses on Article 66.2, and provides a case study of 
four developed country Members to assess their implementation of the 
provision.  Next, Part III outlines political and judicial solutions to ensure 
 
 18.  See generally Chon, supra note 7. 
 19.  See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 2, at 4 n.5 (discussing how “transfer of know-how” 
permits the transmission of technical knowledge from developed to least-developed countries). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 22.  See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of . . . the transfer and dissemination of 
technology.”); TRIPS Agreement art. 8.2 (promoting the “international transfer of technology”); 
TRIPS Agreement art. 66.2 (encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members). 
 23.  For the full text and analysis of Article 66.2, see discussion infra Section II. 
 24.  See Moon, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that least-developed countries “see technology 
transfer as part of the bargain in which they have agreed to protect intellectual property rights”). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Balaklaw, supra note 5, at 156; see also Technology Transfer, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/techtransfer_e.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). 
 27.  While there were compromises reached with “developing” countries as well, Article 
66.2 focuses specifically on least-developed countries.  This paper will focus exclusively on the 
relationship between developed and least-developed countries. 
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that developed countries, in partnership with least-developed countries, 
fully implement Article 66.2.  This paper concludes with recommendations 
for increased coordination between developed and least-developed 
countries in order to ensure the successful transfer of technology as 
envisioned by the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
I.  THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IS A “BARGAINED-FOR” EXCHANGE 
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
One hundred and twenty-eight nation-states initially formed the 
WTO.28  Shaping the trade agreements within the WTO thus required 
consideration of the diverse interests of all Member countries.29  With 
respect to the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO prescribed strict enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.  The TRIPS Agreement harmonized intellectual 
property protections globally under the economic theory that stronger 
protections enable firms in least-developed countries to acquire increased 
investment opportunities and to license innovative technologies more 
easily.30 
 
A. History Behind the TRIPS Negotiations and Formation of the 
WTO 
 
After World War II, the Allied Powers sought to form a world order 
characterized by liberal international trade.31  Led by the U.S., Canada, and 
England, 28 countries signed the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) in 1947.  The Agreement formed an international trade 
organization with a General Council composed of all Member nations.  
GATT included a dispute resolution body that could enforce the 
Agreement’s provisions by imposing sanctions on Member nations that did 
 
 28.  The 128 Countries that Had Signed GATT by 1994, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 29.  See infra Section I.A for a general history of the compromises reached between 
developed and least-developed countries to form the WTO.  See also Overview of the WTO 
Agreements, METI, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2011WTO/2-0Overview. 
pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 30.  Maskus & Okediji, supra note 8, at 1 (“Intellectual property rights are justified by a 
number of key assumptions about market actors, most notably that clearly defined property rights 
facilitate optimal levels of investments in research and development, minimize transactions costs 
in licensing negotiations, encourage further innovation by disclosing new knowledge, and 
enhance downstream inventive activity build on existing patent data.”). 
 31.  See CHAD P. BROWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE 10-22 (2010), https://www.brookings.e 
du/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/selfenforcingtrade_chapter.pdf. 
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not follow particular trade requirements.32  The Agreement also established 
negotiating rounds where Member nations could discuss relevant changes 
they wanted to propose within the larger trade association.33   
Before the WTO’s formation, intellectual property rights were 
principally regulated at the international level by a number of treaties 
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).34  
These treaties included the Paris Convention on Industrial Property35 and 
the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works.36  Starting in the 
1970s, developed countries expressed concern that the treaty system 
administered by WIPO failed to adequately protect their technology-based 
industries.37  This concern ignited the Uruguay Round,38 where developed 
countries brought about amendments to GATT with the aim of 
incorporating intellectual property rights into the larger international trade 
framework.  From the perspective of developed countries, the TRIPS 
Agreement was thus a vehicle to fill a gap in the 1947 GATT legal 
system.39 
The negotiations to incorporate intellectual property protections within 
GATT pitted developed countries against least-developed countries.40  
Unlike developed countries, least-developed countries preferred to rely on 
the already-existent international agreements within WIPO.41  To strike a 
compromise, Chairman Lars Anell drafted a formal document (known as 
the “Chairman’s report”) reflecting the requests of both developed and 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS  (1998). 
 34.  UNCTAD & INT’L CTR. ON TRADE AND SUBSTANTIAL DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON 
TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD]. 
 35.  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 2, 
828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 36.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 168 
Consol. T.S. 185, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 37.  Hold & Mercurio, supra note 6, at 4. 
 38.  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 
(Apr. 15, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144-53 (1994). 
 39.  UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 34, at 2–3. 
 40.  GERVAIS, supra note 33, at 17; see generally Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, 
Trade & Development, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 507 (2005) [hereinafter IP, Trade & 
Development]; Amnon Lehavi, Globalizing Property Law: An Institutional Analysis, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1173, 1204–05 (2017). 
 41.  GERVAIS, supra note 33, at 10 (Chile’s statement at the Uruguay Round is illustrative: 
(“[I]t is Chile’s intention that it should in no case be incorporated in the structure of the GATT, 
but rather that, if it is adopted, it shall be the subject of an agreement to be administered by WIPO 
or another organization other than GATT.”). 
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least-developed countries.42  The Report outlined strict protections of 
intellectual property rights under the GATT umbrella, and provided for the 
differential treatment of least-developed countries, including deferred 
implementation provisions and promises of technology transfer.43  In 
addition, to further mitigate the resistance of least-developed countries, 
developed countries offered additional concessions in other GATT trade 
agreements, including increased access to textile and agricultural markets.44  
With the promise of differential treatment and other trade concessions, 
least-developed countries were ready to commit to enforcing the 
intellectual property rights originating in developed countries’ technology-
based industries.  Accordingly, the signing of the TRIPS Agreement is 
widely considered part of a package deal that formalized the creation of the 
WTO.45 
 
B. The “Give and Take” Within the TRIPS Agreement  
 
The TRIPS Agreement is microcosmic of the larger “bargained-for” 
exchange reached during the Uruguay Round.46  The TRIPS Agreement’s 
text and structure demonstrates the balance reached between developed and 
least-developed countries with respect to their technology-related 
interests.47  Below is a discussion of three particular examples of 
compromises reached within the TRIPS Agreement.48 
 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 27. 
 44.  See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 34, at 4.  Developed countries also threatened to 
impose trade sanctions and to withdraw completely from GATT.  Id. 
 45.  Gervais, IP, Trade & Development, supra note 40, at 507. 
 46.  See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The 
Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property 
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 17 (1998) (“[D]eveloping countries were offered 
greater access to markets for traditional manufactured goods and for their agricultural products in 
exchange for codified obligations to respect intellectual property rights.”). 
 47.  See generally GERVAIS, supra note 33 (discussing that while developed countries 
sought strict intellectual property protections, least-developed countries aimed to create an 
agreement that supported their pursuit for a viable technologically developed economy). 
 48.  This Section does not examine Technology Transfer (TRIPS Agreement art. 66.2) or 
Technical Cooperation (TRIPS Agreement art. 67) but leaves discussion about these 
compromises to Section II.  While Geographic Indications (GIs) are often considered to be a 
debate between the United States and the European Union, protecting GIs favors developing and 
least-developed countries.  For example, GIs may be “hailed as the poor people’s intellectual 
property rights, recognizing the knowledge of weavers, farmers, and craftspeople rather than just 
the high technology contribution of multi-national enterprises.  Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 257, 301 (2006). 
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1. Preamble and Basic Principles 
 
The TRIPS Agreement begins with a preamble acknowledging the 
need to “promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights” and confirming that “intellectual property rights are private 
rights.”49  While leading with this statement might indicate preference 
toward developed country Members,50 the preamble follows by explicitly 
recognizing the “special needs” of least-developed country Members, 
demanding new rules around transitional arrangements.51  According to the 
preamble’s text, the purpose of catering toward the “special needs” of 
least-developed countries is to provide them “maximum flexibility in the 
domestic implementation of laws and regulations.”52  Accommodating 
least-developed country hardships thus ensures that they have the time and 
resources needed to “create a sound and viable technological base.”53  
Finally, the preamble recognizes the “public policy objectives” of the 
international community, including both the “development” objectives for 
least-developed country Members, and the “technological” objectives for 
the developed country Members.54  
In addition to the balance struck in the preamble, the Agreement’s 
“Basic Principles”55 reconcile the competing interests incorporated in the 
TRIPS Agreement.  For example, Article 7 establishes that intellectual 
property protection and enforcement serves dual purposes of (1) 
encouraging technological innovation and (2) the transfer and 
dissemination of technology.56  By stating that these objectives ensure the 
“mutual advantage” of producers and users of technology,57 Article 7 
clearly contrasts the goals of technology-based industries in developed 
countries (promoting technological innovation) with the interests of firms 
in least-developed countries (the transfer and dissemination of 
 
 49.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 50.  See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 249–50 (2003) (“For technologically 
advanced nations, usually net exporters of copyrighted materials and patented products, the 
reduction of piracy, counterfeiting, and other uncompensated uses has obvious pecuniary 
advantages.  The rational response of the developing world is less obvious.”). 
 51.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Heald, supra note 50, at 274. 
 54.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. art. 7. 
 57.  Id. 
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technology).58  In addition, Article 7 affirms the Agreement’s balance of 
“social welfare” concerns among those in resource-poor countries with the 
“economic welfare” considerations of technology-based industries in 
developed countries.59 Article 8 furthers the goals outlined in Article 7, and 
expressly permits Members to formulate laws and regulations that “protect 
public health and nutrition.”60  Article 8 warns of potential intellectual 
property right holders who might hinder this objective by “adversely 
affect[ing] the international transfer of technology.”61  Altogether, the 
preamble and Basic Principles of the TRIPS Agreement encapsulate the 
larger bargained-for exchange reached by developed and least-developed 
countries in forming the WTO. 
 
2. Transitional Arrangements 
 
When negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, many of the least-developed 
countries lacked domestic systems for protecting and enforcing intellectual 
property rights.62  Effective implementation of the Agreement was 
therefore not even a possibility immediately following its signing.63  
Moreover, while least-developed countries wanted access to economic 
markets in developed countries, compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
would impose significant administrative and enforcement costs.64  
Recognizing this reality, least-developed countries actively negotiated for 
provisions allowing deferred implementation of the Agreement.65   
The deferred implementation provisions of Article 65 and Article 66.1 
reflect the negotiating spirit of the 1986 Uruguay Round,66 permitting 
developing and least-developed countries “flexibility”67 not afforded 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. art. 8.1. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See Hold & Mercurio, supra note 6 at 3. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Heald, supra note 50, at 250. 
 65.  GERVAIS, supra note 33, at 255 (“Transitional measures, particularly the date of entry 
into force of the Agreement, were negotiated during many sessions and until close to the end of 
the Uruguay Round.”); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, arts. 65, 66 (distinguishing 
developing countries from least-developed countries). 
 66.  See TERRENCE P. STEWARD, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
(1986-1992), 2313 (Kluwer, Deventer, 1993) (“The [TRIPS Agreement] clearly meets or exceeds 
the initial negotiating mandate articulated in Uruguay in 1986 . . . [I]t provides different treatment 
for developing countries and provides some recognition of different sensitivities within 
intellectual property for developing countries through longer transition periods.”). 
 67.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl.; see also discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
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developed country Members.  For developing countries, Article 65 allows 
for a four-year delay for the general Agreement, and five-year delay for certain 
patents.68  Article 66.1 allows least-developed countries to defer implementation 
for ten-years, and specifically mentions the “special needs” afforded to least-
developed countries within the general Agreement.69  In addition, Article 66.1 
echoes the Agreement’s preamble, mentioning least-developed countries’ “need 
for flexibility” as the primary reason for the ten-year deferral.70  Finally, Article 
66.1 contemplates the “economic, financial, and administrative constraints” of 
rapid implementation of the Agreement.71  In total, the transitional arrangements of 
Article 65 and Article 66.1 demonstrate the concessions provided to least-
developed countries. 
 
3. Enforcing Patents 
 
“Patents are at the heart of some of the most contentious disagreements 
between developed and least-developed countries.”72  Specifically, least-
developed countries sought to leave unprotected patents on certain 
medicines and pharmaceuticals.73  Compulsory licensing of foreign patents 
was therefore an area of intense negotiations leading up to signing the 
TRIPS Agreement.74  Before the WTO, many least-developed countries did 
not recognize patents in pharmaceutical drugs.75  Developed countries thus 
viewed strict patent protections as a key component of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  Specifically, countries with the majority share of the world’s 
pharmaceutical firms stood to gain economically with stronger patent 
rights.76  For example, during negotiations, the U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations (U.N.) said:  
 
 68.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 65.2, 65.4. 
 69.  Id. art. 66.1.  This deferred implementation has been extended numerous times, further 
demonstrating the general understanding within the WTO of meeting the “special needs” of least-
developed countries.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id.; Hold & Mercurio, supra note 6, at 7. 
 72.  DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 260 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by 
Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 383 (2011). 
 75.  See Sunder, supra note 48, at n.15. 
 76.  These countries pushed the “Prospect Theory,” maintaining that property rights vested 
to inventions is justified on the grounds that it will facilitate the more efficient use of resources by 
centralizing control or management over the invention in one entity, which has an economic 
interest in ensuring that it is used, maintained, licensed, and improved in an efficient manner.  See 
CHOW & LEE, supra note 72, at 259 (citing Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 
Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977)). 
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[I]f we get to a system where the protection of patents are 
abrogated in the name of development, then we certainly will kill 
the organization [WIPO].  I am all pro-development, but I’m also 
committed to protecting the rights that were legally granted to 
American companies and other companies for the work that they 
do.77   
 
The resulting TRIPS Agreement set forth a delicate balance between 
the interests of developed countries seeking to strictly enforce patents, and 
least-developed countries hoping to unlock access to life-saving medicines.  
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement provides for substantive minimum 
standards of patent protection, including the requirement that countries may 
not deny patents based on the field of technology.78  This provision 
prohibits Member nations from categorically denying patents to 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology products and processes.79  On the other 
hand, Article 31 provides for the authorization of compulsory licenses for 
“public non-commercial use” in circumstances of “extreme urgency.”80  
This provision balances the strict patent rights negotiated by developed 
countries and gives least-developed countries the ability to access life-
saving medicines when needed.81  
Despite the affirmative compromises made to least-developed countries 
throughout the TRIPS Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement scholars disagree 
about whether the Agreement actually supports the world’s poorest 
countries.82  Free-market proponents of the TRIPS Agreement argue that 
strict intellectual property protections encourage economic growth, and that 
temporary monopolies promote the diffusion of knowledge throughout the 
 
 77.  Id. at 260. 
 78.  Id. at 256. 
 79.  Id. at 256. 
 80.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 31(b); see also Sunder, supra note 48, at 294 
(“The Doha Declaration clarifies that TRIPS allows for each member state to grant compulsory 
licenses in the event of a national emergency or a public health crisis.”). 
 81.  See James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord: 
Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, in Global Intellectual Property Rights: 
Knowledge, Access, and Development 74–89 (2002).  For an overview and example of 
compulsory licensing through the TRIPS Agreement, see James Love, Access to Medicine and 
Compliance with the Compulsory Licensing, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, https://www.keion 
line.org/cl (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 82.  See, e.g., Chon, supra note 7, at 805 (calling the TRIPS Agreement a “top down” 
approach to international development). 
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developing world.  83  On the opposite end of the spectrum, some scholars 
find the TRIPS Agreement overly burdensome on least-developed 
countries.  They maintain that the TRIPS Agreement forces resource-poor 
countries to focus entirely on compliance, and not on absorbing and 
adopting certain technologies.84  Arguing that because developed countries 
were the demandeurs at the Uruguay Round,85 the TRIPS Agreement 
primarily creates wealth for industrialized countries.86 
 
II.  DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE NOT MEETING THE  
ARTICLE 66.2 MANDATE 
 
According to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
 
Developed country Members shall provide incentives to 
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed 
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and 
viable technological base. 
 
Technology transfer to least-developed countries provides firms in those 
countries contact to once inaccessible technologies.87  In order to help least-
developed countries create a “sound and viable technological base,” the 
TRIPS Agreement thus imposes an affirmative duty on developed countries 




 83.  Margaret Chon, Denis Borges, & Barbosa Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Slouching 
Towards Development in International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 77 
(2007).  Scholars point to studies that confirm how foreign investment in least-developed 
countries increases when intellectual property protections are strong.  See Gervais, IP, Trade & 
Development, supra note 40, at 519; Ben Willis, The Arguments for and Against the TRIPS 
Agreement, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENT (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013 
/12/23/the-arguments-for-and-against-the-trips-agreement/. 
 84.  Chon, supra note 7; CORREA, supra note 2, at 10 (“[T]here is no evidence suggesting 
that increased IPRs protection in developing countries will lead to more opportunities for 
acceding to up-to-date technologies, or that the global rate of innovation will increase.”). 
 85.  Hold & Mercurio, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 86.  Id.; Willis, supra note 83. 
 87.  See Balaklaw, supra note 5, at 157. 
 88.  Moon, supra note 10, at 2; CORREA, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing that Article 66.2 puts 
an “obligation” on developed country Members). 
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A. Defining Methods of Technology Transfer to Least-Developed 
Countries 
 
Since 1964, the U.N. has classified “least-developed countries” as the 
world’s poorest and weakest countries suffering from structural 
impediments to economic development.89  The U.N. states that least-
developed countries “require special support form the international 
community.”90  Since the U.N. began releasing a list of least-developed 
countries in 1971,91 the number of countries classified as “least-developed” 
has more than doubled, and now includes 48 total countries.92  Under the 
WTO, a country is considered “least-developed” when classified as such by 
the U.N.93  Currently, 34 of the 48 least-developed countries are Members 
of the WTO and party to the TRIPS Agreement.94 
 
Figure 1: Membership Changes to List of Least-Developed Countries 
 
 89.  See Timeline of LDC Criteria Changes, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ 
development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/creation-of-the-ldc-category-and-time 
line-of-changes-to-ldc-membership-and-criteria.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 90.  UN-OHRLLS, supra note 5. 
 91.  Since 1971, the United Nations has recognized least-developed countries as the “poorest 
and weakest segment” of the international community, that is highly disadvantaged in their 
development process as a result of their vulnerability.  Id.; see also Creation of the LDC 
Category, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-cou 
ntry-category/creation-of-the-ldc-category-and-timeline-of-changes-to-ldc-membership-and-criter 
ia.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 92.  Only five countries have “graduated” from this list. Balaklaw, supra note 5, at 143–44. 
 93.  See Hold & Mercurio, supra note 6. 
 94.  Balaklaw, supra note 5, at 150–51. 
1971 
Afghanistan, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Lao, People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen 
1975-1985 
Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Gambia, Cabo Verde, 
Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sierra Leone, Togo, Vanuatu 
1986-1995 
Kiribati, Mauritania, Tuvalu, Myanmar, Mozambique, Liberia, 
Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Solomon 
Islands, Zambia, Angola, Eritrea 
1995-2018 
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To accurately classify countries as “least developed,” the U.N.  first 
used tangible metrics like gross domestic product (GDP) and adult literacy 
as criteria.95  The U.N. has since expanded its statistical measures for 
classifying least-developed countries.96  Today, the U.N. identifies least-
developed according to both human and economic statistical measures, 
under what is known as the “Human Asset Index” and “Economic 
Vulnerability Index.”97  
 
Human Asset Index Economic Vulnerability Index 
 Under-five mortality rate 
 Percentage of population 
undernourished 
 Maternal mortality ratio 
 Gross secondary school 
enrolment ratio 
 Adult literacy rate 
 
 Population size 
 Remoteness 
 Merchandise export 
concentration 
 Share of agriculture, forestry and 
fishing in GDP 
 Instability of exports of goods 
and services 
 Victims of natural disasters 
 Instability of agricultural 
production 
 
Figure 2: Current Criteria for Classifying a Country as Least-Developed 
 
Substantial barriers prevent least-developed countries from absorbing, 
adapting, and using new technologies.  Insufficient resident know-how, 
lack of capital for domestic firms, and a foreign firm’s aversion to investing 
in unstable markets are just some of the hurdles slowing technology 
transfer to least-developed countries.98  Ninety-two percent of rural 
households in least-developed countries in Africa have no electricity,99 only 
22% of the roads in least-developed countries are paved,100 and 78% of the 
 
 95.  See Timeline, supra note 89.  In 2017, the U.N. defined least-developed countries as 
“low-income countries suffering from the most severe structural impediments to sustainable 
development.”  The Least Developed Countries: Historical Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/events/ldc3/prepcom/history.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 96.  The Least Developed Countries, supra note 95. 
 97.  Id.; see also Criteria for Identification and Graduation of LDCs, UN-OHRLLS, 
http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 98.  Cameron Hutchison, Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology 
Transfer into Developing Countries?, 3 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 517, 520 (2006) (noting a 
business’ considerations before transferring technology to another business in a least-developed 
country). 
 99.  UN-OHRLLS, supra note 5, at 10. 
 100.  This number is particularly low compared to the 88% of roads paved in developed 
countries.  Id. at 6. 
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urban population in least-developed countries live in “slums” or “informal 
settlements.”101  Furthermore, people living in least-developed countries 
face daily health concerns, often lacking access to clean water and proper 
sanitation.102  Consequently, the global community faces an uphill battle 
when attempting to meet the Article 66.2 mandate.   
Technology transfer includes both “hard” technologies (such as 
equipment) and “soft” technologies (such as know-how).103  Immediately 
following passage of the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO Secretariat released 
a Note outlining four methods for facilitating the transfer of technology to 
least-developed countries.  They included: 
 
1. FDI: technology can be transferred through FDI, which might take 
the form of a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint venture with host 
country investors.  More than likely, this transaction involves only 
the supplier of technology.104 
 
2. Stipulated Transfer: technology may transfer through different 
contractual arrangements such as licensing, management contracts, 
or subcontracting.  In a stipulated transfer, the transaction involves 
both the supplier and user of technology, with specific commercial 
conditions regarding the use of that technology.105  
 
3. Copying: a firm can acquire certain technologies by copying them 
through a process of reverse engineering.  Here, there is no 
transaction between parties in developed or least-developed 
countries, but rather only those in the host country use the 
technology.106 
 
4. Free-Transfer: technology may transfer through a transaction 
involving both the supplier and user of technology, but without any 
commercial conditions stipulated.  For instance, a least-developed 
country may impose a compulsory license via Article 31 of the 
 
 101.  Id. at 20. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Hutchison, supra note 98, at 520; Alexander Adam, Technology Transfer to Combat 
Climate Change: Opportunities and Obligations Under TRIPS and Kyoto, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 
10 (2009). 
 104.  Comm. on Trade and Env’t, Note by the Secretariat: Factors Affecting Transfer of 
Environmentally-Sound Technology, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/22 (Feb. 21, 1996). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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TRIPS Agreement, or a developed-country may voluntarily convey 
the technology.107  
 
While these four mediums for technology transfer might exist in 
theory, actualizing technology transfer to “enable [least-developed 
countries] to create a sound and viable technological base” faces practical 
market challenges.108  For example, FDI primarily depends on the host 
country’s economic stability and labor capacity. 109 Understandably, a 
foreign firm contemplating an investment in a least-developed country will 
be concerned with its long-term economic prospects in that country.  This 
firm must therefore consider the likelihood of efficiently integrating its 
product within the host country’s economic market.110  Similarly, the 
economic success of licensing a technology depends on the manufacturing 
experience of the licensee, and operational size of the licensing firm.111  
Consequently, because those living in least-developed countries face daily 
burdens and impoverished physical infrastructure, FDI in least-developed 
countries, or stipulated transfers of technology to firms in least-developed 
countries, seems unlikely without additional intervention.  Furthermore, in 
order to copy or reverse engineer a technology, firms in least-developed 
countries must be able to efficiently install and utilize that technology.112  
Finally, facilitating a “free-transfer” of technology between a developed 
and least-developed country requires effective communication between 
firms in their respective countries, which also faces substantial hurdles.113  
For example, a three-minute phone call from the EU to the U.S. currently 
costs 50 cents; a similar call from sub-Saharan Africa to the U.S. costs 
$3.00.114  
Since the Secretariat’s Note in 1996, development theory has 
incorporated the transfer of “knowledge” to meet the obligations of 
technology transfer.  This type of transfer occurs through the migration of 
students and scientists and may occur by providing scholarships for 
students to attend universities in developed countries or sending tangible 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 10 December 2017, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(17)/40 (2017) (expressing concern that LDCs remain vulnerable due to “supply 
side constraints” and “structural difficulties in the global economy”). 
 109.  Note by the Secretariat, supra note 104, at 3. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  UN-OHRLLS, supra note 5, at 6. 
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products such as textbooks to schools within least-developed countries.115  
Despite this newly recognized medium for transferring technology, 
students and scientists integrating technology in least-developed countries 
still face the same debilitating economic and physical challenges to create a 
“sound and viable technological base.”116, and are thus subject to the same 
hurdles when attempting to fulfill the Article 66.2 mandate. 
 
B. Background on Article 66.2 Compliance 
 
The framers of the TRIPS Agreement recognized the daunting 
challenges facing technology transfer to least-developed countries and thus 
specifically mandated developed countries to “provide incentives” to 
domestic firms.117  Without significant incentives, firms in developed 
countries would most likely spend their resources in more resource-rich 
countries where opportunities for profit are greater.  Taking all of this into 
consideration, Article 66.2 permits developed country Members to provide 
incentives to “enterprises” and “institutions.”118  Accordingly, developed 
country Members may incentivize both private sector firms along with not-
for-profit and public sector institutions to facilitate the required transfer of 
technology under Article 66.2.119  
Despite the expansive language in Article 66.2, least-developed 
country Members have repeatedly criticized developed country Members 
and the WTO for failing to implement the provision’s mandate.120  From 
1995-1998, developed countries did not submit formal reports on their 
implementation of Article 66.2.121  In turn, Haiti protested at the 1998 
TRIPS Council meeting that no action had been taken under Article 66.2.122  
Speaking on behalf of least-developed country Members, Haiti requested 
increased reporting requirements for developed country Members regarding 
their implementation of this provision.123  Three years later, at the Doha 
 
 115.  See Okediji, supra note 8. 
 116.  This is the purpose for the positive obligations placed on developed countries under 
Article 66.2.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2. 
 117.  See Moon, supra note 10, at 5 (“Presumably, one reason for this preferential status was 
that LDCs would be less likely to receive technology transfer through regular market channels if 
they competed directly with middle-income countries.”). 
 118.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2. 
 119.  See Moon, supra note 6, at 2. 
 120.  See, e.g., Hutchison, supra note 98, at n.29 (“LDCs have repeatedly complained that 
little or no action has been taken under [Article 66.2].”). 
 121.  See Moon, supra note 10 at 3 (describing how developed countries did not begin 
submitting formal reports until after the 1998 TRIPS Council meeting). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
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Ministerial Conference,124 least-developed countries once again expressed 
concern that developed countries ignored their duty to comply with Article 
66.2.125  In response, WTO Members formally affirmed the trade 
organization’s commitment to this provision.  The 2001 Doha Decision in 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns articulated as follows: 
 
Reaffirming that the provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement are mandatory, it is agreed that the TRIPS Council 
shall put in place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring and full 
implementation of the obligations in question.  To this end, 
developed-country members shall submit prior to the end of 2002 
detailed reports on the functioning in practice of the incentives 
provided to their enterprises for the transfer of technology in 
pursuance of their commitments under Article 66.2.  These 
submissions shall be subject to a review in the TRIPS Council and 
information shall be updated by Members annually.126 
 
In 2003, the TRIPS Council—the body responsible for administering the 
TRIPS Agreement—codified an Article 66.2 reporting system.127  The 
TRIPS Council stipulated that developed countries “shall submit” detailed 
reports every three years, and annual reports updating their larger 
reports.128  The TRIPS Council outlined the specific information that each 
report must include:129 
 
 
 124.  The Doha Round was officially launched in November 2011 at the WTO’s Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. Like the Uruguay Round, the Doha Round comprised of 
trade negotiations among WTO Members. The Doha Round, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2018). 
 125.  The Ministerial Conference is the “topmost decision-making body of the WTO” and 
meets every two years. It brings together all members of the WTO to discuss relevant issues 
facing the organization’s trade agreements.  See Ministerial Conferences, WTO.ORG, https:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto66_e/minist_e/minist_e.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 126.  See Moon, supra note 6, at 2 (citing WTO, 2001b, para. 11.2). 
 127.  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of 
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. IP/C/28 (Feb. 20, 2003), https://docs. 
wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=11737&C 
urrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextSearch= [hereinafter Implementation of Article 66.2].  The 
TRIPS Council monitors the operations of the Agreement and serves as a forum for discussion 
between members on key issues.  Council for TRIPS, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/tratop_e/trips_e/intel6_e.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 128.  Implementation of Article 66.2, supra note 127, para. 1 (“[Developed Members] shall 
provide new detailed reports every third year, and in the intervening years, provide updates to 
their most recent reports.”); see also Balaklaw, supra note 5, at 156–57. 
 129.  The declaration uses the phrasing “shall provide,” indicating the positive obligation to 
meet these reporting requirements. Implementation of Article 66.2, supra note 127, para. 1. 
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(1) An overview of the incentives regime put in place to fulfill the 
country’s obligations;  
(2) Identification of the government agency or entity making the 
incentive available;  
(3) Eligible enterprises and institutions in the territory of the Member 
providing the incentives; and  
(4) Any additional information on the implementation of these 
incentives, such as: 
a. Statistical or other information on the use of the incentives by 
the eligible enterprises and institutions; 
b. The type of technology that has been transferred by these 
enterprises and institutions, and the terms on which it has been 
transferred;  
c. The mode of technology transfer; 
d. The least-developed countries to which these enterprises and 
institutions have transferred technology; and  
e. Any additional information that would help the TRIPS Council 
assess the effects of the measures in promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members.130  
 
In 2011, communicating on behalf of the least-developed country 
Members, Angola submitted a Declaration outlining a proposed format for 
the Article 66.2 reporting.131  Despite the reporting system outlined by the 
TRIPS Council and the proposed format outlined by Angola, the transfer of 
technology from developed countries to resource-poor nations has been 
considered “lackluster” by both least-developed country Members and 
WTO officials.132 
Still, the Doha Conference and subsequent TRIPS Council reporting 
system jumpstarted increased reporting by developed country Members.133  
According to international development scholar Suerie Moon, less than ten 
countries reported annually on their implementation of Article 66.2 from 
1999 to 2003.  From 2004 to 2009, over 17 countries reported annually.134  
However, while submitting annual reports might indicate a country’s 
attentiveness to satisfying Article 66.2 compliance, the mere act of 
 
 130.  Id. para. 1-3. 
 131.  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposed Format for 
Reports Submitted by the Developed Country Members Under Article 66.2, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/561.  To see the Proposed Format, see infra Appendix A. 
 132.  See generally Report of the Working Group on Trade supra note 17. 
 133.  See Moon, supra note 6, at 3. 
 134.  Id. 
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submitting a report does not accurately reflect the nature of a country’s 
policies to incentivize technology transfer to least-developed countries.135  
In fact, notwithstanding the increase in submitted annual reports, many of 
the programs reported by developed countries did not target least-
developed countries.136  For instance, Moon’s 2011 study showed that of 
the 384 programs submitted by developed countries between 1999-2007, 
only 34% were targeted specifically toward least-developed country 
Members, and 18% of the reported programs targeted least-developed 
countries that are non-WTO Members.137  The remainder of the technology 
transfer programs targeted non-least-developed countries, or were aimed at 





Figure 3: Article 66.2 Program Recipients from 1999-2010 (LDC = least-
developed country) 
 
The text of the TRIPS Agreement confirms that those drafting the 
Agreement explicitly provided for certain provisions to target different 
classes of countries.  For example, Article 65 discusses the rules and 
regulations around deferred implementation for “developing” countries 
only.139  Immediately following Article 65, Article 66.1 discusses deferred 
implementation for “least-developed” countries.140  Article 67 commands 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. at 4. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 65.2, 65.4 (referring specifically to 
developing country members). 
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developed countries to provide technical assistance to “developing” and 
“least-developed” countries.141  Article 66.2 specifically mandates the 
transfer of technology to only least-developed countries and is silent with 
respect to obligating the transfer of technology to “developing countries.” 
142  Thus, Moon’s study suggests that between 1999-2010, developed 
country Members generally failed to meet their Article 66.2 obligations to 
target incentives for programs that transferred technology to exclusively 
least-developed countries.   
 
C. Case Study: Developed Countries Implementing Article 66.2  
 
Despite the term “developed country” being used to create the legal 
obligation under Article 66.2, the WTO has no clear definition of 
“developed.”143  One possible classification for “developed” countries is by 
membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).144  Established in 1960, the OECD is made up of 35 
Member countries.145  The OECD is a community of nations committed to 
“the values of democracy based on the rule of law and human rights, and 
adherence to open and transparent market-economy principles.”146  The 
organization articulates that its Members have key economic and public 
governance indicators in common, such as (1) a rules-based open market 
economy, (2) tax transparency and international cooperation, (3) a stable 
and transparent financial system, and (4) a strong regional or global role in 
the world economy.147  According to Moon’s 2011 study, 70% of OECD 
countries submitted Article 66.2 implementation reports between 1999-
2010.148  This paper looks closely at the Article 66.2 implementation 
 
 141.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 67 (“In order to facilitate the implementation of 
this Agreement, developed country Members shall provide . . . technical and financial cooperation 
in [favor] of developing and least-developed country Members.”) (emphasis added). 
 142.  Id. art. 66.2.  Article 66 is titled “Least-Developed Country Members.” 
 143.  See Moon, supra note 6, at 2. 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  Members and Partners, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
    146.    Meeting of the OECD Council at the Ministerial Level, Report of the Chair of the 
Working Group on the Future Size and Membership of the Organisation to Council, Framework 
for the Consideration of Prospective Members, OECD.ORG (June 7, 2018) (“The codification of 
membership criteria—a comprehensive framework”) at 4, http://www.oecd.org/mcm/docu 
ments/C-MIN-2017-13-EN.pdf. 
 147.  Framework for the Consideration of Prospective Members: Report of the Chair of the 
Working Group on the Future Size and Membership of the Organization to Council, OECD.org 
(June 7, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2017-13-EN.pdf. 
 148.  Moon, supra note 6, at 3. 
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reports of four OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, and the U.S.149  




To begin, each country affirmatively acknowledges its obligation to 
submit its implementation report “pursuant to” or “in accordance with” 
paragraph 1 of the reporting system outlined by the TRIPS Council.151  
Next, both Canada and the U.S. articulate that their reports are an 
“illustrative,” and not exhaustive, list of all incentives provided to their 
territory’s enterprises and institutions.152  In comparison, Australia states 
that its 2017 report is “a full report in respect of Article 66.2.”153  Japan is 
silent with respect to whether its report is illustrative or exhaustive.154  
Finally, both Australia and Canada indicate that their reports conform to 
the proposed format as suggested by Angola and least-developed country 
Members in 2011.155  Altogether, this paper identified and analyzed 19-
total programs in Australia’s report, 20-total programs in Canada’s report, 




 149.  List of OECD Member Countries, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/about/members 
andpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 150.  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Report on the 
Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: Australia, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/631/Add.1/Rev.1 (Oct. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Australia Report]; Canada, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/631/Add.3 (Oct. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Canada Report]; Japan, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/631 
(Sept. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Japan Report]; United States, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/631/Add.2 (Sept. 
28, 2017) [hereinafter U.S. Report]. 
 151.  See Reports cited, supra note 150. Each Report references the TRIPS Council document 
outlining the goals and requirements for Developed Country Members to implement Art. 66.2.  
See Implementation of Article 66.2, supra note 127. 
 152.  Canada Report, supra note 150, para. 3; U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 2 (“No 
report can represent every activity that directly or indirectly incentivizes enterprises and 
institutions for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer, but this report 
attempts to describe the most significant activities and programs and to convey the breadth and 
depth of U.S. efforts.”). 
 153.  Australia Report, supra note 150, para. 2. 
 154.  See Japan Report, supra note, 150, para. 3 (“[T]he Government of Japan would like to 
report on the following activities.”). Future research comparing a country’s Article 66.2 report 
over a span of years may be fruitful. 
 155.  See Australia Report, supra note 150, para. 8; Canada Report, supra note 150, para. 7. 
 156.  All data was collected and coded by this paper’s author. This paper does not represent 
complete accuracy and is subject to a margin of error. A breakdown of the data can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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1. Program Recipients 
 
One of the main criticisms levied by least-developed country Members is 
that developed country Members do not specifically target them in their reported 
Article 66.2 programs.157  This criticism is justified.  While Article 66.2 plainly 
mandates developed country Members to support technology transfer to “least-
developed country Members,”158  Australia and Canada explicitly mention in their 
reports that they target both developing and least-developed countries to effectuate 
Article 66.2.159  In fact, none of the 2017 implementation reports submitted by 
Australia, Canada, Japan, or the U.S. directed Article 66.2 programs exclusively 
toward least-developed countries.  Like the reports analyzed in Moon’s 2011 
study, the Australia, Canada, Japan, and U.S. reports often described programs that 
provided incentives for technology transfer to both “developing” and “least-
developed” countries together.  In addition, like Moon’s research, many of the 
2017 programs analyzed were directed toward regions, without specifically 
targeting a country or a few least-developed countries.  In light of this data, it is not 
surprising that on December 11, 2017, the Ministers of least-developed countries 
submitted the following Declaration: 
 
We request that Members in the TRIPS Council deliberate and 
come to a decision in favour of [least-developed countries] that 
pursuant to TRIPS 66.2, developed country Members shall only 
specify incentives provided to least-developed countries for 
technology transfer.  We further request that the TRIPS Council 
deliberate on the meaning of “incentives to enterprises and 
institutions” found in Article 66.2 and possible ways to providing 
incentives by developed country Members to their enterprises and 
institutions [in] order to meaningfully implement the letter and 






 157.  See LDC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 108, at 3.4. 
 158.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2. 
 159.  Australia Report, supra note 150, para. 2 (“The report focuses on incentives that are 
either targeted specifically at LDCs or at a group of countries which includes an LDC. Australia 
has recognized LDC as those countries which have been designated as such by the United 
Nations, noting all of which may not be WTO Members. In some cases. Australia has reported on 
programs that include developing and least developed countries.”); Canada Report, supra note 
150, para. 3 (describing that its report provides an overview of incentives provided to Canadian 
enterprises and institutions, “which are either targeted specifically at LDCs or to groups that at a 
minimum include an LDC). 
 160.  LDC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 108, para. 3.4 (emphasis added). 
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Australia Canada Japan United States 
68% 35% 64% 66% 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Programs Directed Specifically Toward Least-
Developed Countries in 2017 
 
Looking specifically at Canada’s report illustrates the larger issue 
articulated by least-developed countries in their 2017 Declaration.  One of 
Canada’s programs entitled “Clean Technology Fund” provided $200 
million to the World Bank161 to support investment in the use of clean, low-
carbon technologies.162  Canada indicated that its “Targeted LDC 
Members” were in “multiple Countries in Asia, Africa, and the Americas.”  
Next, Canada’s program “Food Security Innovation and Mobilization” 
provided $17 million to a partner NGO to transfer agricultural production 
technologies to help farmers increase their yields and resilience to climate 
change.163  According to the report, this program targeted “multiple 
countries, including Burkina Faso.” Canada indicated that of the $17 
million invested in this program, approximately $7.9 million, or 47%, was 
devoted to Burkina Faso, a least-developed country Member of the 
WTO.164  Thus, while both of these programs have important benefits for 
least-developed countries, they miss the command of Article 66.2 to 
specifically target least-developed countries.   
Other programs in Canada’s report satisfied the Article 66.2 obligation 
to target only least-developed country Members.  First, a program entitled 
“Agricultural Transformation Through Stronger Vocational Education” 
granted $18.3 million to Dalhousie University to provide “high-quality 
training [to instructors and staff] that meets the needs of Ethiopia’s 
commercially-oriented agriculture sector.”165  In addition, Canada’s “Solar 
Technology for the West African Economic and Monetary Union” program 
provided $2.1 million to a Montreal-based University to transfer “skills, 
knowledge, and expertise” to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal.166  These 
two programs represent the 35% of initiatives that targeted only least-
 
 161.  The World Bank is a multilateral organization.  See Who We Are, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).  Providing incentives to 
the World Bank by itself would not satisfy the Article 66.2 mandate.  See infra Section II.C.2 for 
a discussion of incentivizing governments and multilateral organizations to transfer technology to 
least-developed countries. 
 162.  See Canada Report, supra note 150, at 14-15 (Example #6). 
 163.  See id. at 10-11 (Example #3). 
 164.  See id. at 10-11 (Example #3). 
 165.  See id. at 11-12 (Example #4). 
 166.  See id. at 20-21 (Example #11). 
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developed countries.  Again, while least-developed country Members 
benefited from technology transfer as a result of broader policies covering 
all developing countries or regions, a key aspect of Article 66.2 is to single 
out least-developed countries for targeted action.167  This preferential 
treatment is undoubtedly a critical element of the “bargained-for” exchange 
reached at the Uruguay Round.  Consequently, when developed countries 
fail to target least-developed countries exclusively, they do not meet their 
end of the bargain within the TRIPS Agreement.168 
 
2. Incentivizing Enterprises and Institutions 
 
The TRIPS Agreement obligates developed country Members to “provide 
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories” to fulfill the 
provision’s technology transfer command.169  According to the Oxford 
Dictionary, the word “incentive” means “incitement to action, to do, 
provocation.”170  The term “enterprises and institutions” encompasses not only 
private-sector entities, but also not-for-profit and public-sector entities (e.g., 
research institutions).171  While education and basic knowledge transferred 
through “institutions” helps create an environment for technological 
development to take root,172 scholars agree that technology transfer primarily 
flows through private markets.173  When private enterprises engage with one 
another, participants may choose among trade in goods that embody 
technology, FDI, stipulated licensing agreements, or professional service 
agreements.  In doing so, firms in least-developed countries can most 
effectively absorb, adopt, and use the transferred technologies.174 
Technology transfer between enterprises requires purposeful investments 
by both parties.175  Understandably, without strong incentives, it is unlikely 
that private enterprises will voluntarily engage in technology transfer 
 
 167.  See Moon, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing how least-developed countries would be less 
likely to receive technology transfer through regular market channels if they competed directly 
with middle-income countries). 
 168.  See supra Section I. 
 169.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2. 
 170.  CORREA, supra note 2, at 23. 
 171.  See Moon, supra note 6, at 2. 
 172.  Chon, supra note 7, at 819 (“A well-informed, educated and skilled citizenry is 
indispensable to the development process.”). 
 173.  See, e.g. Maskus & Okediji, supra note 8, at 6. See also CORREA, supra note 2 
(commenting that it must be private markets that facilitate technology transfer, and that the 
government role is to provide incentives). 
 174.  See generally CORREA, supra note 2. 
 175.  See Maskus & Okediji, supra note 8, at 6. 
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arrangements with firms in least-developed countries.176  International firms 
tend to not file patents in the poorest countries, and technology owners display 
little intention of deploying their technology in least-developed countries.177  
The result is a cyclical process whereby least-developed countries endure 
limited opportunities to adapt or absorb technologies from firms in developed 
countries.  Understanding this reality, the framers of TRIPS Agreement Article 
66.2 specifically commanded developed countries to incentivize domestic 






Australia Canada Japan 
United 
States 
Enterprises 0% 0% 0% 7% 
Institutions 5% 50% 31% 16% 
Gvt.  & Multilateral 
Orgs. 
52% 40% 69% 53% 
LDC Entities 42% 10% 0% 24% 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Programs Incentivizing Enterprises and Institutions 
 
 176.  CORREA, supra note 2, at 11 (“The low technical capacity of local enterprises constrain 
their ability to license-in technology, while the low GDP per capital in LDCs is not likely to 
stimulate potential transferors to engage in such arrangements.”); Maskus & Reichman, supra 
note, at 289 (noting that economies with low incomes and limited technological capacity do not 
present attractive markets for private enterprises in developed countries, especially when firms 
may choose to invest in more developed countries around the world). 







Australia Canada Japan United
States
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Enterprises 
 
Data collected from the Australia, Canada, Japan, and U.S. reports 
showed a shockingly small number of incentives provided by these 
developed countries to enterprises “in their territories.”  The U.S. was the 
only country to incentivize domestic firms, and its report indicated only ten 
of the 134 programs that provided incentives to U.S.-based enterprises.178  
An example of a U.S. program incentivizing a domestic firm was the 
“Madagascar Solar and Battery Storage Minigrid Project.”179  In this 
program, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) provided 
financing for a joint venture project between Fluidic Inc., an Arizona-based 
energy storage company, and Henri Fraise Fils & Cie, a firm in 
Madagascar.  The USTDA funding supported the deployment of solar 
power battery storage for 2,000 people in Madagascar.180  In another 
program, the U.S. provided funding to Boston-based WrightGrid USA to 
establish a network of charging stations at universities throughout the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).181  The goal of the project was 
to incentivize WrightGrid to invest in the DRC and to support the larger 
Congolese market, where cell phone users suffer from chronic citywide 
blackouts.182  Both of these U.S. programs fall squarely within the ambit of 
the Article 66.2 mandate.  Both Fluidic Inc.  and WrightGrid are 
“enterprises” in U.S. “territory,” and both received incentives (in the form 
of financial support) to transfer technology to a least-developed country 




Funding for domestic “institutions” was a common incentive provided 
by Canada and Japan.  For example, Global Affairs Canada—an agency of 
the Canadian government—provided $10 million to Digital Opportunity 
 
 178.  Categorization between an enterprise and institution was done through basic internet 
searches for the organization’s corporation status; not-for-profit organizations and universities 
were considered “institutions” while private companies were categorized as “enterprises.” 
 179.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 136; see also Home, FLUIDICENERGY, 
http://fluidicenergy.com (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Power Profile – Henri Fraise Fils & Cie, 
CAT.COM, https://www.cat.com/en_US/articles/customer-stories/electric-power-generation/pow 
er-profile-henri-fraise-fils-cie.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
 180.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 136 (discussing how the funding is currently being 
used to support a feasibility study to launch the joint-venture pilot project). 
 181.  Id. para. 137; see WrightGrid, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organiza 
tion/wrightgrid (last visited Apr. 24, 2018) (“WrightGrid specializes in designing and 
manufacturing solar-powered charging stations.”). 
 182.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 137. 
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Trust (DOT), a Canadian-based not-for-profit organization, for a program 
in Ethiopia called “Entrepreneurship and Business Growth for Youth” in 
Ethiopia.183  The funding supported DOT in providing vocational training 
and business support services to micro and small growing enterprises in 
Ethiopia.184  Similarly, Japan provided funding to the Association for 
Overseas Technical Cooperation and Sustainable Partnerships (AOTS) to 
deliver technical training courses for engineers and professionals in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.185  According 
to the Japan report, AOTS provided training to local firms in these least-
developed countries to improve their management capacities, and to train 
them in communication technology and human organizational problem 
solving.186  Finally, like Canada and Japan, the U.S. supported not-for-
profit and university “institutions” for 16% of its Article 66.2 programs.  
An example of U.S. compliance with Article 66.2 includes the “All 
Children Reading Cambodia” program.187  Through this program, the U.S. 
provided funding to Research Triangle Associates (RTI), a North Carolina-
based not-for-profit, to develop an early grade program for Cambodian 
children.188  The funding supports RTI’s work with the Cambodian 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports to support this transfer of 
knowledge.189  Like the Canadian and Japanese programs, this U.S. 
program incentivized a domestic institution to facilitate the flow of 
technology to a least-developed country Member. 
 
Government and Multilateral Organizations  
 
Article 66.2 enumerates “enterprises” and “institutions” as the entities 
that may transfer technology to least-developed country Members.  Private 
enterprises and institutions—and not developed country governments—
 
 183.  Canada Report, supra note 150, at 7–8 (Example #1); see Digital Opportunity Trust, 
DOT.ORG, https://www.dotrust.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Global Affairs Canada, 
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/international/index.aspx?lang=eng 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
 184.  See Canada Report, supra note 150, at 8 (Example #1). 
 185.  Japan Report, supra note 150, para. 7-8.  AOTS is a nonprofit organization with the 
mission to develop human resources in developing countries, to promote technical cooperation 
through training, and to dispatch experts and other programs to resource-poor nations.  See 
AOTS, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/AOTSJAPAN.E/about/?ref=page_internal 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
 186.  Japan Report, supra note 150, para. 9. 
 187.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 26. 
 188.  Id.; see Contact Us, RTI INTERNATIONAL, https://www.rti.org (last visited Apr. 24, 
2018). 
 189.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 26. 
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own the vast majority of the world’s technologies.190  The framers of the 
TRIPS Agreement understood this, and therefore explicitly sought to have 
third-party entities transfer technology, rather than governments or 
multilateral organizations.  A literal reading of Article 66.2 thus indicates 
that purely governmental projects do not comply with the treaty’s 
mandate.191  Still, more than half of the Australia, Japan, and the U.S. 
programs were government-led initiatives.  Only Canada provided 
incentives to non-governmental entities more than half the time, and 
Canada still had 40% of its programs directly implemented through 
government agencies.  Within the U.S. report, an example of a government-
led project included the USAID Safaa Paani project in Nepal.192  This 
project involved the USAID working directly with the Ministry of Water 
Supply and Sewage in Nepal to construct 200 gravity flow water systems 
and 10 public toilets.193  The project is ongoing, and aims to work with 200 
communities from 14 Nepalese villages.194  All expertise and monetary 
support for this program has come directly from the U.S. government, and 
not from a third-party enterprise or institution.   
Two examples of Australian programs incentivizing a government or 
multilateral organization are particularly illustrative of this larger problem 
with Article 66.2 implementation.  First, the “Training to Bangladesh 
Ministry of Agriculture in Sanitary and Phytosanitary topics” program 
involved the Australian government transferring technology directly to the 
Bangladesh government.195  The program provides increased funding for 
the Australian Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR) to 
train eight officers of the Bangladesh Ministry of Agriculture.196  Australia 
writes in its report that DAWR used the increased funding to provide these 
Bangladesh officials training and training materials, to help them assess 
and manage biosecurity risks associated with agricultural exports or 
imports.197  Next, the Australian program entitled “ASEAN Regional 
Diagnostic Network Project” involved the Australian government 
providing funding to the Economic Cooperation Work Programme 
(ECWP).198  The ECWP is funded directly by the ASEAN-Australia-New 
 
 190.  CORREA, supra note 2, at 23 (citing the European Communities). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 109. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Safaa Paani (Wash Recovery) Program, USAID.org (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www. 
usaid.gov/nepal/fact-sheets/safaa-paani-wash-recovery-program. 
 195.  See Australia Report, supra note 150, at 14–15. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 17–18. 
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Zealand Free Trade Agreement.199  This program charged the ECWP with 
providing workshops and training on diagnostics of plant pests and diseases 
to ASEAN members, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.200  
While all of these programs might have specifically targeted least-
developed countries, they involved a developed country Member short-
circuiting the Article 66.2 mandate.  Rather than providing incentives to 
third-party enterprises or institutions, these programs were “purely 
governmental projects.”201  Finally, the Japan report is especially troubling 
with respect to its reliance on government-led transfers of technology.  
Nearly 70% of the Japanese programs were facilitated directly via the 
Japanese national government.   
 
Least-Developed Country Entities 
 
Importantly, the TRIPS Agreement specifies that developed countries 
may provide incentives to enterprises and institutions “in their territories.” 
Data collected from the Australia, Canada, Japan, and U.S. report showed a 
surprisingly large number of programs that provided incentives to entities 
outside the developed country’s territory.  Specifically, 24% of the U.S. 
programs and 42% of the Australia programs provided incentives to entities 
outside “their territories.  For example, the USAID “Civil Society Mutual 
Accountability Project” funds Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL), a civic tech 
company headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal.202  The U.S. report describes 
KLL as “the implementing partner.”203  Similarly, Australia provided 
incentives to entities in least-developed countries in 42% of its reported 








 199.  See Overview of the AANZFTA Economic Cooperation Support Program (AECSP), 
AANZFTA.ORG, http://aanzfta.asean.org/aecsp-overview/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
 200.  Australia Report, supra note 150, at 17–18. 
 201.  See CORREA, supra note 2 (discussing how “purely governmental programs” do not 
satisfy the Article 66.2 command). 
 202.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 74; see Civil Society: Mutual Accountability Project, 
USAID (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.usaid.gov/nepal/fact-sheets/civil-society-mutual-accountab 
ility-project; Contact Us, http://www.kathmandulivinglabs.org/contact (last visited Apr. 24, 
2018). 
 203.  U.S. Report, supra note 150, para. 74. 
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III.   ENSURING FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 66.2 
 
Theories supporting strict enforcement of intellectual property rights 
are grounded in “utilitarian” goals.204  Because technology is non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable, the potential for free-riding eliminates the incentive to 
produce information.205  Thus, state-granted property rights in both “hard” 
and “soft” technologies (e.g., knowledge and machinery) create the 
excludability necessary to incentivize further innovation and creative 
production.206  The TRIPS Agreement is the WTO mechanism for 
organizing property rights for both “hard” and “soft” technologies.   
Like the larger “bargained-for exchange” that formed the WTO, the 
TRIPS Agreement organizes these intellectual property rights in a manner 
that simultaneously meets the needs and interests of both developed and 
least-developed countries.207  For example, while the Agreement outlines 
the “exclusive rights” vested in copyright and patent owners, it 
simultaneously moderates those rights through “certain special cases”208 
and compulsory licensing.209  More broadly, the TRIPS Agreement 
established both minimum requirements protecting intellectual property 
rights in Part II of the Agreement, and a framework for transitional 
arrangements in Part VI of the Agreement.210  Located in Part VI, Article 
66.2 vests in least-developed country Members with the right to possess 
transferred technology.211  Despite Article 66.2 not specifying what kind of 
technology must be transferred, the provision nevertheless affirms the right 
that least-developed country Members hold to possess some transferred 





 204.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
 205.  See Sunder, supra note 48, at 283. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See supra Section I. 
 208.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases.”). 
 209.  See id. art. 31. 
 210.  See infra discussion on the bargained-for exchange in Section I. 
 211.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2 is similar to TRIPS Agreement art. 31, 
which vests Member countries with the right to possess license to patentable subject matter under 
certain circumstances. 
 212.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2. Traditional property law recognizes a 
party’s right, under certain circumstances, to Exclude, Possess, Use, and Transfer. 
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A. Legal Solution: Enforcing Article 66.2 via Dispute Settlement 
 
Parts III, IV, and V of the TRIPS Agreement lay out the enforcement 
obligations and dispute resolution procedures for all WTO Members.213  As 
outlined in these Parts of the TRIPS Agreement, the primary mechanism 
for enforcing rights and obligations under the Agreement is through the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) rules.214  During the 
Uruguay Round, it was the developed countries’ desire to create an 
effective mechanism to combat piracy and counterfeiting that drove the 
adoption of the DSU rules into the TRIPS Agreement.215  In doing so, the 
TRIPS Agreement gave more bite to the economic obligations under the 
Paris and Berne Conventions.216  The DSU thus applies to the TRIPS 
Agreement in context of the Uruguay Round package, and was part of the 
“bargained-for” exchange that all Member countries accepted as a 
condition of WTO membership.217  
Least-developed countries may be entitled to bring claims alleging a 
developed country’s noncompliance with Article 66.2.  The DSU rules 
establish a WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) comprised of 
representatives from all WTO Members.218  The DSB administers WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings.  To do so, it may establish panels to hear 
disputes and an Appellate Body to review panel decisions.219  Article 3.2 of 
the DSU rules requires that panels and the Appellate Body, when 
administering a dispute proceeding, “preserve the rights and obligations of 
 
 213.  See CHOW & LEE, supra note 72, at 696; see generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
21, Part III (“Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights), Part IV (“Acquisition and 
Maintenance of Intellectual Property Rights and Related Inter-Partes Procedures”), Part V 
(“Dispute Prevention and Settlement”). 
 214.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 64.  The Dispute Settlement Understanding 
rules can be found in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e. 
htm#top [hereinafter DSU Rules]. 
 215.  See DSU Rules, supra note 214; see also infra Section I.A. 
 216.  Harris, supra note 74, at 378. 
 217.  Daniel T. Shedd, et. al., Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): 
An Overview, Congressional Research Service (Nov. 26, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mi 
sc/RS20088.pdf. 
 218.  Id. at 2; see DSU Rules, supra note 214, art. 2.1 (“The Dispute Settlement Body is 
hereby established to administer these rules and procedures and, except as otherwise provided in a 
covered agreement, the consultation of dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements. 
Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to . . . maintain surveillance of implementation of 
rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspensions of concessions and other obligations 
under the covered agreements.”). 
 219.  DSU Rules, supra note 214, art. 17.1 (“A standing Appellate Body shall be established 
by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases.”). 
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Members under the covered agreements.”220  The text of Article 66.2—by 
using the words “shall provide”221—imposes specific “obligations” on 
developed countries to incentivize enterprises and institutions.  In doing so, 
Article 66.2 thereby grants “rights” to least-developed countries to receive 
this technology transfer.222  
In addition, under the DSU rules, a panel or Appellate Body must 
interpret the TRIPS Agreement “in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.”223  An early Appellate Body 
report confirmed that the “rules of interpretation” mentioned in Article 3.2 
fall under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.224  
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty shall be 
interpreted “with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”225  According to the 
Vienna Convention, the “context” of a treaty’s terms includes the treaty’s 
text and its preamble.226  Finally, should the DSB need further help 
interpreting a provision’s meaning, it may look to the “preparatory work of 
the treaty.”227  Thus, when interpreting Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the DSB will look to the Agreement’s preamble, Articles 7 and 
 
 220.  Id. art. 3.2. 
 221.  Other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement use “may provide”.  Moon, supra note 6, at 2 
(“TRIPS Article 66.2 establishes a mandatory, binding, positive legal obligation on ‘developed 
country’ Members of the WTO”). 
 222.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall 
provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting 
and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members . . .”) (emphasis 
provided). 
 223.  DSU Rules, supra note 214, art. 3.2. 
 224.  Shedd et. al., supra note 217, at 4 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); 
see also CORREA, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that the WTO panels and Appellate Body have 
consistently applied Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention). Australia, Canada, and Japan 
are parties to the treaty. Chapter XXIII: Law of Treaties, United Nations Treaty Collection (Apr. 
25, 2018), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en. The U.S., while not a party, has signed the 
Convention and recognizes its authoritative status. Shedd et. al., supra note 217, at n. 14. 
 225.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.1 (1969), https://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf; see UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra 
note 34, at 2. 
 226.  Vienna Convention, supra note 225, art. 31.1.  Even more, the Public Health 
Declaration passed at the Doha Round maintained that “each provision of the TRIPS Agreement 
shall be read in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed . . . in its object and 
principles.”  Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 14, 2001), https:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. 
 227.  Vienna Convention, supra note 225, art. 32. 
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8 of the Agreement,228 and relevant negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round.229  
The TRIPS preamble confirms the creation of “obligations” and 
“rights” in Article 66.2.230  In particular, the preamble explicitly mentions 
that the TRIPS Agreement was formed to create new rules and disciplines 
concerning “transitional arrangements aiming at the fullest participation in 
the results of the negotiations.”231  In addition, the preamble articulates the 
need to recognize “the special needs of the least-developed country 
Members . . . to create a sound and viable technological base.”232  The 
framers of the TRIPS Agreement placed Article 66.2 in Part VI of the 
Agreement, entitled “Transitional Arrangements.”233  As indicated in its 
title, Article 66—as compared to Article 65—concerns least-developed 
countries exclusively.234  Finally, Article 66.2 specifies that the purpose 
behind the developed countries’ obligation to incentivize enterprises and 
institutions is to enable least-developed country Members “to create a 
sound and viable technological base.”  This language mirrors that used in 
the preamble and is further proof that the preamble affirms the positive 
obligations imposed on developed countries in Article 66.2. 
Next, the “object and purpose” as articulated in Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement further support the “obligations” and “rights” created by 
Article 66.2.  Article 7 specifically refers to the “balance of rights and 
obligations” as an objective of the Agreement.235  In addition, Article 7 
balances the “mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge” to create “social and economic welfare.”236  The obligations 
imposed on developed countries under Article 66.2 ensure that developed 
countries—the producers of technological knowledge—contribute to the 
social and economic welfare in least-developed countries.  Article 8 
similarly affirms the Article 66.2 mandate, discussing the need to promote 
“the international transfer of technology.”237  Ensuring the international 
transfer of technology is the purpose of Article 66.2.  Therefore, the DSB 
 
 228.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 7 (“Objectives”); id. art. 8 (“Principles”); see 
supra Section I.B.1 for a discussion of these Articles. 
 229.  See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 33, at 37. 
 230.  See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
 231.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl, subsection (e). 
 232.  See id. pmbl. 
 233.  See id. Part VI. 
 234.  See id. art. 66; see also discussion supra Section II.C.1 on Program Recipients for 
further demonstration of the specification between developing and least-developed countries. 
 235.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 7. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. art. 8. 
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may rely on Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement to support a least-
developed country’s claim against a developed country that fails to fulfill 
the textual commands of Article 66.2.238  Altogether, the TRIPS Agreement 
preamble, Articles 7 and 8, and the Uruguay Round negotiations239 
demonstrate the clear intention behind Article 66.2 and its position within 
the “bargained-for” exchange of the TRIPS Agreement.  Failure to comply 
with this provision is thus a breach of the Agreement.   
One may defend the inability of developed countries to meet the 
command of Article 66.2, and argue that the political and economic 
instability in least-developed countries makes the obligation implausible.  
Even more, one may argue that the deferred implementation provisions of 
Article 65 and Article 66.1 undermine the specific obligations imposed on 
developed countries in Article 66.2.  The preponderance of econometric 
studies suggests that market-mediated flows of technology respond 
positively to the strengthening of patent laws across countries.240  
Consequently, if least-developed countries are given leeway to integrate 
intellectual property enforcement laws and regulations, then no matter the 
incentive, private markets simply will not invest in those impoverished 
countries.  And, even if strict intellectual property regimes in least-
developed countries are not particularly important to attract technology 
transfer, these countries have limited technological capacities and 
economies that provide little to no opportunity for an enterprise to profit.  
As such, least-developed countries are such unattractive markets to begin 
with that even the most aggressive incentives provided by a developed 
country Member would not successful encourage a firm to invest in those 
countries.  Consequently, Article 66.2 sets up developed countries to fail.241  
These arguments, while reasonable, are unpersuasive.  It is true that the 
markets and economies in least-developed countries are frighteningly poor.  
 
 238.  But see Harris, supra note 74, at 382 (discussing that while reliance on Articles 7 and 8 
might be a “key basis for a pro-development interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement,” relying on 
these provisions to bring a successful claim before the DSB because the WTO panel has yet to 
officially interpret these provisions).  Perhaps this paper provides encouragement to least-
developed countries to bring a claim before the DSB so that it may have the opportunity to 
interpret the TRIPS Agreement “Objectives” and “Principles” in light of the command of Article 
66.2. 
 239.  See supra Section I.A for a discussion of the Uruguay Round negotiations for proof that 
Article 66.2 is part of the larger bargained-for exchange between developed and least-developed 
countries. 
 240.  Maskus & Reichman, supra note, at 289. 
 241.  Maskus & Reichman, supra note, at 289 (“Economies with low incomes and limited 
technological capacity present neither attractive markets nor a competitive imitation threat. 
Because their intellectual property regimes are not particularly important in attracting 
[international technology transfer], it seems unlikely that the standards implemented in 
compliance with TRIPS will encourage additional technology transfer to the poorest countries.”). 
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It is also true that private enterprises and institutions in developed countries 
might find it risky—both financially and physically—to spend resources in 
least-developed countries.242  However, this is precisely why the framers of 
the TRIPS Agreement included Article 66.2.  If not for Article 66.2, it is 
debatable whether least-developed countries would have even agreed to 
sign onto the TRIPS Agreement to begin with.  Without the positive 
obligations placed on developed countries in Article 66.2, firms “in their 
territories” would choose to invest in countries with less risk and more 
economic opportunity.  Therefore, this argument only further demonstrates 
the purposeful textual command of Article 66.2.   
CONCLUSION 
 
In most instances, resource-poor countries find it cheaper and faster to 
acquire foreign technologies than to develop them with domestic 
resources.243  As evidenced from the history of the U.S. and China’s 
technological development, weak intellectual property protections can 
hasten industrial transformation.244  While negotiating directly with an 
industrial giant like the U.S., least-developed countries agreed to sign the 
TRIPS Agreement—and, thus, protect the technology-based industries in 
developed countries—under the promise of receiving transferred 
technology in return.245  Despite not being the demandeurs of integrating 
intellectual property within GATT, the least-developed countries 
negotiated an agreement that, in its text, promises using “technical 
knowledge” to protect public health and nutrition, encourage social and 
economic welfare, and create viable technological economies in least-
developed countries.246  In total, the “bargained-for” exchange promised the 
mutual advantage of a harmonized intellectual property trade scheme.   
Today, least-developed countries comprise 21% of WTO Membership.  
Unfortunately, because least-developed countries do not receive what they 
bargained for, the TRIPS Agreement only further entrenches the growing 
 
 242.  Id. at 288 (discussing the instability in poor countries, and that “[t]echnology developers 
are interested in reducing the costs and risks of making transfers, along with protecting their 
rights to profit from them”). 
 243.  Id. at 287. 
 244.  Id. at 290 (discussing how Japan and South Korea were models of countries of now-
developed economies that underwent significant technological learning and industrial 
transformation with the benefit of weak intellectual property protections). 
 245.  See Balaklaw, supra note 5, at 156 (noting that technology transfer was part of the 
bargain in which least-developed countries agreed to protect intellectual property rights). 
 246.  See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21. 
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economic divisions between developed and least-developed countries.247  
Least-developed countries hold the largest and most rapidly growing youth 
population; about 60% of the population in least-developed countries is 
under the age of 25.248  As such, there is great opportunity to harness this 
young talent for future development and growth.  This youthful population 
may be educated through increased funding of scholarships, cultivated to 
become entrepreneurs through training, and supported financially to 
develop and grow micro-enterprises in their home countries.  With the full 
implementation of Article 66.2, the TRIPS Agreement may harness this 
latent talent and lay the foundation for solving the most world’s most 
pressing issues. 
 
 247.  See Hutchison, supra note 98, at 8. 
 248.  UN-OHRLLS, supra note 5, at 19. 
